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We present a simple regularization of adversarial pertur-
bations based upon the perceptual loss. While the resulting
perturbations remain imperceptible to the human eye, they
differ from existing adversarial perturbations in that they
are semi-sparse alterations that highlight objects and re-
gions of interest while leaving the background unaltered. As
a semantically meaningful adverse perturbations, it forms a
bridge between counterfactual explanations and adversar-
ial perturbations in the space of images.
We evaluate our approach on several standard explain-
ability benchmarks, namely, weak localization, insertion-
deletion, and the pointing game demonstrating that percep-
tually regularized counterfactuals are an effective explana-
tion for image-based classifiers.
1. Introduction
We address the gap between counterfactual explanations
[53] and adversarial perturbations [48], and show why min-
imal changes in image data that results in a change in clas-
sifier response does not result in semantically meaningful
alteration. One might hope that the smallest edit to alter
classifier response of an image labeled as bird should al-
ter the bird pixels, but in practice adversarial perturbations
make non-local changes that break the classifier. We show
how penalizing changes in the mid-level classifier response
with a perceptual loss stops this breakage and instead re-
sults in semantically meaningful changes that highlight the
extent of objects in images (see Figs. 1,2).
Outside of computer vision [53], counterfactual explana-
tions are a popular method in explainable AI. They find the
smallest change needed to alter the decision of a classifier,
and on tabular data, can give explanations such as:
“The loan was denied as your income was £30,000. If it
had been £45,000, you would have been offered a loan.”
∗Equal contribution
†Much of this work was done prior to joining Amazon.
Figure 1. Object localization. From left to right: Original image;
Magnitude of the perceptual perturbations; Dominant connected
component and the bounding box from automatic object detection.
Despite the flowers our method highlights the butterfly as salient.
The close relationship between adversarial perturbations
and counterfactual explanations follows from the definitions
in philosophy and folk psychology of a counterfactual ex-
planation as answering the question “What is a minimal
change that would result in a different outcome?” When
applied to classifiers, these counterfactual explanations are
simply adversarial perturbations, by a different name. As
such, it is interesting to ask, why adversarial perturbations
don’t work as explanations: Why are they imperceptible?
and: Why don’t they localize on objects?
Two compelling arguments for the existence of imper-
ceptible adversarial perturbations in images have been of-
fered. The first due to [16] remarks that they are simply an
artifact of a high-dimensional space, and thus, it is entirely
expected that a small perturbation of every pixel can add up
to a large change in the classifier response, and that in fact
the same behavior is found in linear classifiers.
A second argument attempts to understand why sparse
(potentially single pixel) attacks exist and attributes the ef-
fectiveness of adversarial perturbations to exploding gradi-
ents. ‘Exploding gradients’ refers to the phenomenon where
changes in functional response grow exponentially with the
depth of the network, relative to a change of input of fixed
magnitude. These exploding gradients are an issue known
to afflict the learning of Recurrent Neural Networks [30],
and the deep networks common to computer vision. This
phenomenon occurs because, by construction, neural net-
works form a product of (convolutional) matrix operations
interlaced with nonlinearities; and for directions/locations
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Figure 2. A representative image showing the effects of regularization over different VGG19bn layers (σ = 2.0). As we extend the
regularization to cover higher layers we find the perturbation becomes more compact and better localized upon the object.
in which these nonlinearities act approximately linearly, the
eigenvalues of the Jacobian can grow exponentially with
depth1. While this phenomenon is well-studied in the con-
text of training networks with remedies such as normaliza-
tion [19] and gradient clipping [30], the same phenomenon
occurs when generating adversarial perturbations. As such,
a carefully chosen small perturbation to have an extremely
large effect on the response of a deep or recurrent classifier.
To explore how these arguments fit together, and which
explanation accounts for the familiar behavior of adversarial
perturbations, we propose a simple novel regularization that
bounds the exponential growth of the classifier response by
regularizing the perceptual distance [20] between the image
and its adversarial perturbation.
One common criticism of adversarial perturbation is that
the generated images lie outside the manifold of natural im-
ages, and if we could sample from the manifold, our adver-
sarial perturbations would be both larger and more repre-
sentative of the real world. Restricting adversarial perturba-
tions to this manifold should limit the impact of exploding
gradients – if samples are drawn from this space then a well-
trained classifier should implicitly reflect the smoothness of
the true labels of the underlying data distribution.
While it is believed that the manifold of natural images
is low dimensional [22], characterizing this manifold out-
side of handwritten digits has proven extremely challeng-
ing2. Our approach provides a complementary lightweight
alternative. Rather than attempting to characterize the man-
ifold, we penalize search directions that exploit exploding
gradients as these encourage movement off the data mani-
fold when searching for minimal adversarial perturbations.
We propose a novel regularization for adversarial pertur-
bations based around the perceptual loss. Our new perturba-
tions tend to highlight objects and regions of interest within
the image (see Fig. 1)3. We evaluate on several standard
explainability challenges for image classifiers and further
validate using the sanity checks of [1].
1See [30] for a formal derivation.
2See discussion in the experimental section of [46].
3Our implementation can be found at www.github.com/alan-
turing-institute/perceptualBall.
2. Prior work
Numerous approaches to adversarial perturbations have
been proposed previously. These can loosely be divided into
white-box [3, 6, 25, 26] approaches that assume access to
the underlying nature of the model and black-box methods
which do not [24, 29]. The search for an adversarial pertur-
bation is often formulated as trying to find the closest point
to a particular image, under the ℓ∞, ℓ1 or ℓ2 norm that takes
a different class label. Numerous defenses have been pro-
posed [27, 36] but they can often be circumvented [49].
Other works that add additional constraints to the pertur-
bation to try to make the generated images more plausible.
Such works restrict the space of perturbations considered
by trying to find an adversarial perturbation that confounds
many classifiers at once [8], or is robust to image warps [2].
Other approaches considered only a single image and sin-
gle classifier, but restricted adversarial perturbations to lie
on the manifold of plausible images [15, 39, 43, 46]. The
principal limitation of these approaches is that they require
a plausible generator of natural images, something that is
achievable with small simple datasets such as MNIST but
currently out of reach for even the 224 by 224 thumbnails
used by typical ImageNet [37] classifiers.
Adversarial Perturbations and Counterfactuals There
are substantial works [52, 53] relating adversarial pertur-
bations and counterfactual explanations. This relationship
follows from the definitions in philosophy and folk psychol-
ogy of a counterfactual explanation as answering the ques-
tion “What could have been different in order for outcome
A to have occurred instead of B?”. With full causal mod-
els of images being outside our grasp, such questions are
commonly answered using Lewis’s Closest Possible World
semantics [23], rather than Pearl’s Structured Causal Mod-
els [31]. Under Lewis’s framework, an explanation for why
an image is classified as ‘dog’ rather than ‘cat’ can be found
by searching for the most similar possible world (i.e. image)
which is assigned the label ‘cat’ by the classifier.
Conceptually, this is no different to searching for an ad-
versarial perturbation sampled from the space of possible
images. Several approaches have been proposed that ei-
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Figure 3. Comparison of explainability methods on ImageNet validation images. In contrast to many other approaches that highlight edges,
ours highlights the textured interior of the object. This is consistent with the known textual bias of ImageNet trained CNNs [14].
ther bypass the requirement that the counterfactual is an
image, and return text descriptions [18], naı̈vely ignoring
the requirement that the world is plausible [53], used pro-
totypes [51], or auto-encoders [7], or Gaussian kernels [13]
to characterize the manifold of plausible images, or require
large edits that replace regions of the image, either with the
output of GANs [4] or with patches from other images [17].
Recent works [21, 50] suggested that robust classifiers
naturally encourage perceptually aligned gradients. Our in-
sight can be seen as complementary, rather than requiring
that the classifier is robust, we prohibit perturbations from
exploiting the fragility arising from exploding gradients.
Adversarial Perturbations and Gradient Methods The
majority of methods in the explainability of computer vi-
sion tend to be gradient or importance-based methods that
assign an importance weight to every pixel in the image;
every superpixel; or to mid-level neurons. These gradient
methods and adversarial perturbations are strongly related.
In fact, with most modern networks being piecewise linear,
if the found adversarial perturbation and the original image
lie on the same linear piece, the difference between the orig-
inal image and closest adversarial perturbations under the
ℓ2 norm is equivalent to the direction of steepest descent,
up to scaling. As such, ℓ2 adversarial perturbations can be
thought of as a slightly robustified method of estimating the
gradient, that takes into account some local non-linearities.
Of the pure gradient-based approaches, [40] calculated
the output gradient with respect to the input image to cre-
ate a saliency map giving fine-grained, but potentially less
interpretable results. Other gradient approaches include
SmoothGrad [42] which stabilizes the saliency maps by av-
eraging over multiple noisy copies, and Integrated Gradi-
ents [47] which accumulates gradients seen when perturb-
ing an empty image to the input image.
CAM based approaches [38, 57] sum the activation maps
in the final convolutional layer of the network. These small
activation maps are up-sampled to obtain a heatmap that
highlights particularly salient regions. Grad-CAM is a gen-
eralized variant which finds similar regions of interest to
the perturbation based approaches [38]. Recently, [34] in-
troduced a framework that tries to unify these various gra-
dient approach by proposing NormGrad, which aggregates
the spatial gradient contributions of individual layers.
Perturbation methods estimate the local sensitivity over
a larger range than gradient methods. For example, [55]
applied constant occlusion masks to different input patches
repeatedly to find sensitive regions. LIME [35] constructed
a linear model using the responses obtained from perturb-
ing super-pixels. The recent work on Extremal Perturba-
tion [10] estimates an optimal mask of the image to occlude
which gives a maximal effect on the network’s output.
Various experiments have been proposed to test explana-
tions including the pointing game [33, 38, 56], the weakly
supervised object localization task [5, 12] and the insertion
and deletion game [33, 54]. In particular, [1] developed
experiments to test the suitability of saliency methods. A
number of existing saliency techniques have been evaluated
using these experiments, including: NormGrad [34], Ex-
tremal Perturbation [10], Gradient [40], RISE [33], Grad-
CAM [38], SmoothGrad [42], GuidedBackprop [45], Inte-
grated Gradients [47], Deconvolution [55], and Excitation
Backpropagation [56]. We evaluate our approach on all
these tests and compare against standard methods.
3. Methodology
We consider a classifier C(·) that takes an image x as
input, and returns a k dimensional confidence vector.
For classifiers that assign a single class to each im-
age, we assume the classifier C(·) assigns the label i =
argmaxj Cj(x) to the image x. Given image x classified







and note that Mi(x′) ≤ 0 if and only if C(·) does not assign
label i to image x′.
For classifiers C(·) that assign multiple classes to a sin-
gle image (e.g. pointing game (Sec. 4.4)), we assume that
the classifier C(·) assigns the labels I = {∀j : Cj(x) > 0}
Figure 4. Perceptual Perturbations on ImageNet as explanations. Illustration of perceptual perturbations on typical images taken from
ImageNet [37]. See discussion in Section 4, and for further examples see Fig. S1 in supplementary materials section A.
to the image x. For each i ∈ I , we are interested in the per




Again, Mi(x′) ≤ 0 if and only if C(·) does not assign label
i to image x. In both cases, an adversarial perturbation x′





where T is a target value smaller than zero. It is well-




+ λ||x′ − x||22 (4)
is equivalent to finding a minimizer of Eq. (3) that lies in
the ball defined by ||x− x′||22 ≤ ρ for some ρ. As such,
minimizing this objective for an appropriate value of λ and
T is a good strategy for finding adversarial perturbations of
image x with small ℓ2 norm.
Writing C(l)(x) for the classifier response of the lth layer










defined over a set of layers of the neural network L.
The second term is the perceptual loss of [20], and min-
imizing this objective is equivalent to finding a minimizer




(l)(x′)− C(l)(x)||22 ≤ ρ
′ for some ρ′.
To convert the adversarial perturbation to a saliency map,
we first calculate the size of the adversarial perturbation
in each pixel by computing the average squared difference
over the channels. Second, in order to highlight areas with
large changes, we apply a Gaussian blur with parameter σ
to the differences to give our resultant saliency map.
We systematically evaluate the effect of altering the regu-
larized layers for a range of tasks. We find that the method is
relatively stable and Eq. (5) performs better than the unreg-
ularized Eq. (4) for weak localization, insertion and deletion
and the pointing game. As shown in Fig. 2, as more layers
are regularized the perturbation becomes more localized.
4. Perceptual Perturbations as Explanations
Before describing our experimental overview, we give a
qualitative analysis of the perceptual perturbations (Fig. 4).
The perturbations do a good job of localizing on a single
object class, even in the presence of highly textured images
(dragonfly on fern), and in images with multiple classes
(baseball and people). Some error in localization seems to
arise from supporting classes adjacent to the object - e.g.
human legs behind the lawnmower are found to be salient.
Furthermore, a qualitative evaluation can be seen in
Fig. 3. These images were selected to be challenging – we
visualize a subset of those images where unregularized ad-
versarial perturbations did not align with the object. Com-
pared to other visual explanation techniques, our method
highlights the interior textures of the target object in the
image. This differs from gradient-based methods which
capture finer edge details such as SmoothGrad [42] and to
activation-based methods which highlight the entire object
coarsely such as Grad-CAM [38]. This is perhaps clearest
in the first image where we capture the interior texture of
the socks rather than just its hard contours.
4.1. Sensitivity Studies
For all experiments we performed extensive sensitivity
studies to evaluate the importance of regularizing over dif-
ferent layers (Fig. 5). Certain trends can be detected. Regu-
larizing over most of the layers is effective for weak local-
ization, insertion and deletion, and pointing games. How-
ever, the pointing game performs best with different layers,
possibly as you only need to find a single point of an object,
we find that regularizing only the top layer is optimal in our































Figure 5. Sensitivity study on the choice of layers regularized for the three games where the ith and jth entry displays the performance
from regularizing layers {i, i + 1, . . . , j − 1}. Top shows the performance of weak localization for the unguided variant and the guided
variant (Lower is better). The best performance is achieved when we regularize ReLU layers from 4 to 9 for the unguided variant and
from 0 to 14 for the guided variant. Middle shows the performance of deletion for the unBlur variant (lower is better) and insertion for the
blur variant (higher is better). ReLU layers from 0 to 12 have been selected as it achieves the largest deviation between deletion score and
insertion score. Lower shows pointing game, with left panel representing orig. image size and right the resized image size. We regularize
by each set of ReLU layers from ReLU 0 to ReLU 12, with i = j = 0 equivalent to the no perceptual approach, and report the average
success rate (higher is better). For ease of presentation in this game we present the best performance over σ ∈ {0, 1, . . . 100}.
4.2. Weak Localization
We evaluate perceptual perturbations as explanations us-
ing the weak localization protocol [12], and test our ap-
proach on the first 2000 ImageNet [37] validation images.
We construct a set of bounding boxes for the largest con-
nected region using three simple strategies based on: thresh-
olding the raw values, thresholding a fixed percent of the
image, and thresholding scaled by the image mean follow-
ing [12]. To match the previous thresholding strategies we
normalize individual saliency maps to be in the range of
[0, 1] before applying the blur. For the first strategy, we
use a value threshold where we grid search over the set of
thresholds α where 0 < α ≤ 1 at intervals of size 0.05. For
the second strategy, we use a percentage threshold where
we consider the α% most salient pixels grid search over the
same interval. For the third strategy, we use a threshold
scaled by the per image mean where we grid search over
the set of thresholds α where 0 < α ≤ 10.50 at intervals
of size 0.05. We report the scores on all three strategies as
well as the optimal strategy for each explanation method.
For each threshold, we extract the largest connected com-
ponent and draw a bounding box around it. The object is
considered to be successfully localized when the Intersec-
tion over Union measure between this box and the ground
truth is at least 0.5. Following Grad-CAM’s guided version
[38], which makes use of image gradients, we consider a
guided variant of our own method consisting of an element-
wise multiplication between our perturbations and the nor-
malized gradient of the Ci(x) with respect to the image x.
We set T = −2, λ′ = 10000,λ = 1 in Eq. (5), and we
run an ablation study for the first 1000 images. We select
two sequential sets of ReLU layers to regularize over in a
VGG19bn network [41] using the value-threshold strategy.
For the un-guided variant of our method, we regularize from
Method Value Per. Mean Best
GuidedBP [45] 0.48 0.52 0.49 0.48
Grad-CAM [38] 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.48
Guided-Grad-CAM [38] 0.46 0.49 0.45 0.45
Excitation [56] 0.48 0.50 0.44 0.44
SmoothG [42] 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.47
IntegratedG [47] 0.44 0.51 0.48 0.44
Extremal [10] 0.55 0.52 0.54 0.52
RISE [33] 0.51 0.52 0.48 0.48
NormGrad [34] 0.49 0.52 0.46 0.47
sNormGrad [34] 0.49 0.52 0.47 0.47
Us NoPer 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.46
Us Unguided 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43
Us Guided 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.41
Table 1. Results for Weak Object Localization (lower is better, see
sec.4). We have the lowest error for each thresholding strategy.
ReLU 4 to 9 (0 indexed) and for the guided variant we reg-
ularize from ReLU 0 to 14. We report the results for each
strategy using these layers. Qualitative evidence suggests
that regularizing sequentially more and higher layers tends
to improve object localization in the image (see Figs 2,5).
We compare our method, its guided variant and our
method without the perceptual loss to other methods [10,
33, 34, 38, 42, 45, 47, 56]. For the methods in [38, 42,
45, 47], we used the PyTorch CNN Visualizations reposi-
tory [28]. For [10, 56], we use the TorchRay implementa-
tion [9] and for [34], we use its NormGrad branch [11]. For
RISE [33] we used the authors code from [32]. We used the
provided parameters for all methods.
We varied σ ∈ [1, 30] and found that results saturate
at σ = 20 for all three thresholds. We outperform all
other methods (see Table 1). Our guided variant obtains the
lowest error for two thresholding strategies and joint best
using mean-based thresholding. The non-guided version
performs second-best in value thresholding, percent-based
thresholding, and joint best in the mean-based threshold-
ing strategy. When selecting the best possible threshold for
each method, our method and it’s unguided variant achieve
the lowest and second lowest error rates respectively.
4.3. Insertion/Deletion Game
We compute the insertion and deletion metrics from [33].
For the deletion metric, we construct the deletion response
curve by sequentially changing the most salient pixels from
their original value to mid-gray and measuring the classifier
response. The deletion metric is defined as the AUC of the
deletion curve, a smaller AUC score (i.e. a sharper drop
in classifier response) is considered indicative of a better
explanation. The insertion metric is similar, however, rather
than removing the pixels of largest saliency, it inserts the
original values into a blurred version of the original image.
Method Deletion Score Insertion Score
Gradient [40] 0.19 0.51
Deconv [55] 0.21 0.56
GuidedBP [45] 0.14 0.57
Excitation [56] 0.12 0.63
Grad-CAM [38] 0.11 0.64
Extremal [10] 0.16 0.62
RISE [33] 0.12 0.65
NormGrad [34] 0.09 0.58
sNormGrad [34] 0.10 0.59
blurDiff (σ = 2.5) 0.14 0.59
Us NoPer (σ = 0.0) 0.10 0.42
Us NoPer (σ = 2.5) 0.15 0.54
Us (σ = 0.0) 0.07 0.54
Us (σ = 1.0) 0.09 0.61
Us (σ = 2.5) 0.11 0.62
Us (σ = 5.0) 0.12 0.63
Table 2. Results for deletion (first column) and insertion game
(second column). The result shows our method performs better
than other methods for the deletion metric (without blur) and is
comparable to other methods for the insertion metric (with blur).
The metric is again the AUC of the insertion curve, however
a higher AUC score is considered better as this corresponds
to a sharper increase in classifier response with the addition
of the most salient pixels.
We set T = −2, λ′ = 10000,λ = 1 in Eq. (5), and
we run an ablation study for the first 500 images. We iden-
tify the ReLU layers from 0 to 12 to regularize over in a
VGG19bn network that achieve an optimal difference be-
tween having a high insertion score and a low deletion score
(see Fig. 5). We found that Gaussian blurring the saliency
map improves the performance for the insertion metric,
while it decreases the performance of the deletion metric.
We varied the blur width between 1 and 30 and found the
performance for insertion saturates when σ ≥ 4.0. For con-
sistency, we used the blur function in [33].
We compare our perceptual method and its blurred vari-
ants with a set of alternative methods for this experiment
[10, 33, 34, 38, 40, 45, 55, 56]. We use the standard imple-
mentation of this game from the RISE repository [33, 32].
We compare our method with RISE from the above pack-
age and each of the saliency methods implemented in the
TorchRay package [9] using the standard settings. For Nor-
mGrad we used its branch in the TorchRay Repository [11].
We include two additional baselines. The first baseline is
our method without the perceptual loss and the second base-
line is the ℓ2 norm between the image and a blurred version.
Our approach performs significantly better than our base-
line and is noticeably better than all others for the deletion
metric and joint third for the insertion metric (see Table 2).
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Figure 6. Insertion (higher is better) and Deletion (lower is better) metrics [33]. The average AUC over 5000 images in the ImageNet
validation set as pixels are sequentially set to, or changed from, their value in the original image.
4.4. Pointing Game
Additionally, we evaluated on the pointing game intro-
duced by [56] on the VOC dataset. In this game the task
is to select a single point in the image which is in the ob-
ject in question [56]. The game is subdivided into 2 sub-
tasks, a standard set of images, and a more difficult subset in
which the object occupies less than 25% of the image, and
must also contain a distracting class (see [56]). We use the
TorchRay [9] implementation of the game and comparison
methods and [11] for the implementation of NormGrad.
The pointing game uses a modified VGG16 classifier that
assigns multiple classes to a single region of the image, and
thus we use Eq. (5) with T = −10, λ′ = 1000, λ = 1 and
the formulation from Eq. (2). In this game, the images vary
in size, and the classifier returns a detector like response for
a set of overlapping regions of the image. Given a choice of
class, we suppress all candidate regions by ensuring that the
maximal response of any region is close to the target value.
As with the previous games, we select the layers and blur
using an ablation study. We test each range of contiguous
layers from the first ReLU layer, to final ReLU layer, and
we vary the blur between 0 and 1004. We perform the study
on the first 500 bounding boxes, which corresponds to 457
standard bounding boxes of which 160 are in the difficult
subset and 43 boxes excluded by the benchmark.
Results can be seen in Fig. 5 lower left. Due to the
reduced dataset (457), we report the success rate over the
standard set, rather than the average class success reported
on the full dataset. For compactness, we display the best
result over the σs, and to measure consistency we present
the percentage of σs which yield a performance above
82% (SM B.2). Two layer sets achieve the largest score,
ReLU 9 (layer 22) with σ ∈ {47, 48} or ReLU 12, with
σ ∈ {41, 42}. We select ReLU 9 with σ = 48. The first
layer is less sensitive to the choice of blur with ≈ 70% giv-
ing a result above 82% in contrast to the ≈ 44.6% for the
final layer (this setting also gives a lower performance over-
4For efficiency, we create one perturbation per set of layers and vary σ
Method Orig. Image Scaled Image
Center 69.6 (42.4) 69.6 (42.4)
Gradient [40] 76.3 (56.9) 84.6 (70.0)
Deconv [55] 67.5 (44.2) 75.0 (53.5)
GuidedBP [45] 75.9 (53.0) 83.7 (67.1)
Excitation [56] 77.1 (56.6) 84.0 (67.5)
Grad-CAM [38] 86.6 (74.0) 89.1 (77.7)
Extremal [10] 88.0 (77.3) 86.4 (71.0)
RISE [33] 86.7 (75.4) NA (NA)
NormGrad [34] 81.9 (64.9) 88.6 (75.6)
sNormGrad [34] 86.0 (72.7) 90.1 (80.8)
Us NoPer 81.2 (62.9) 86.0 (71.6)
Us 85.1 (69.0) 88.2 (76.5)
Table 3. Results for the Pointing Game. We present two sets of
results, the performance on the images in the original size (first
column), and second the performance on images which are scaled
to 1.5x using bilinear scaling (second column). For each result,
the first number shows the percentage on the standard set, with the
number in brackets the performance on the difficult set.
all with a score of 83.8% (66.4%)).
The full results, conducted on all images/tests are pre-
sented in the left column of Table 3. We are competitive
with the best methods, with a 2.9% performance difference
with the best method in the standard setting. Further, in
SM B we present a study with a limited set of σs where we
achieve qualitatively similar results, but only a 0.3% drop
in standard performance and no drop in the difficult setting.
We additionally compare to our framework with the same
parameters but without the perceptual loss (with the blur
which maximizes the ablation score - see SM B.1). We refer
to as this ‘no perceptual’. As we see in Table 3 our version
with the perceptual loss outperforms it. We also display this
approach in the ablation study (top left corner). The percep-
tual loss outperforms in almost all cases, with exceptions in
the low layers. Further, the results with the perceptual are
more consistently above 82% (SM B).
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Figure 7. Sanity checks plots. These plots demonstrate how our saliency maps change when we randomise the underlying classifier.
Finally, we also propose an additional pointing game ex-
periment. As this game is defined on non-standard sized
image, we consider the case where we increase the size of
the images via a simple resizing, and test the performance
on this set. This helps performance as the fully convolu-
tions network then gives predictions for more areas that are
then maximized over. We implement this as a pre-and post-
processing step, where we resize the image, construct the
saliency map, and resize the saliency map to the correct size.
We perform a similar ablation study for this case, (Fig. 5
bottom right panel). The optimal layer in this case is ReLU
12 with σ ∈ {28.0, 30.0}, (selected 30).
The results can be seen in the right column of Ta-
ble 3, where most methods work on this new dataset (the
TorchRay RISE implementation requires a perfectly sized
image and is NA). The performance of many of the meth-
ods is increased in this new approach, with many weaker
methods substantially increasing (except for center - a base-
line which chooses the center point). Further, the perfor-
mance characteristics of the best performing methods also
improves with resizing, albeit by lower margins, indicat-
ing that this resizing generally helps almost all methods.The
best performing method is Selective NormGrad with a score
of 90.1%, 2.1% above the previously highest score. Our
Perceptual method is competitive with the best performing
methods, achieving a score of 88.2%.
4.5. Sanity Checks
Finally, we apply the Sanity Checks proposed in [1] to
our method. We randomize the weights on the final k lay-
ers of the network, and observe how the saliency of our
approach varies visually. We perform this experiment on
VGG19bn, as most of the experiments in this paper were
performed on this network, and we match the remaining
parameters/layers to the insertion deletion study. When ran-
domizing the layers we set the parameters to the value that
would have been in an untrained network. We select the
layers in the VGG19bn architecture that correspond to the
VGG16 layers used by [34], namely each fully connected
layer and the final convolution in each set with the excep-
tion of the first set for which we use the first convolution.
Fig. 7 shows the results on three common sanity check
images. As the layers are progressively randomized, salie-
ncy spreads from the relevant objects towards other objects
and highly textured regions in the image, and is mostly non-
existent after the second convolution qualitatively matching
the behavior in Selective NormGrad seen in [34].
5. Conclusion
We explored a novel regularization for adversarial per-
turbations based on the perceptual loss. This regularization
is designed to block the exploitation of exploding gradients
when generating adversarial perturbations forcing larger
and more meaningful perturbations to be generated. The
fact that they remain imperceptible to humans is another
piece of the puzzle in understanding the interrelationship
between adversarial perturbations, neural networks, and hu-
man vision. We believe that the imperceptible nature of our
adversarial perturbations is due to both explanations dis-
cussed in the introduction for the existence of adversarial
perturbations being partially correct. Even when regular-
izing over the layers of our network and preventing adver-
sarial perturbations from exploiting exploding gradients and
some of the inherent instability in deep networks, Szegedy
et al.’s [48] argument still holds and one can obtain a new
class label by slightly altering a large number of pixels.
We have shown how these perturbations can be inter-
preted as explanations and obtained state-of-the-art results
on several standard explainability benchmarks.
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